Introduction
The Great Recession cut a swath of joblessness through the American workforce that was unprecedented in one important way. In previous recessions, the brunt of the job losses was borne by younger, lower-paid workers, and these workers again suffered the most in this recession. But the Great Recession also left older workers more exposed than ever before (Munnell and Rutledge 2013) . The unemployment rate among those 55 and older reached a record 7.3 percent in August 2010, surpassing 6 percent for the first time since 1950. Even this record unemployment rate among older workers understates the breadth of the suffering, as currently employed individuals may have previously experienced a job loss; indeed, in a slightly younger sample, Farber (2011) The difference in the responses to the recession before and after age 62 implies that the decision to leave the labor force and retire depends crucially on the availability of resources to buttress consumption, both during the jobless spell and after retirement.
This project investigates the association between retirement timing and the availability of Social Security and UI benefits, financial and pension wealth, and labor market prospects, using high-frequency labor market data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. This project further investigates how these factors have changed over time, as pension coverage has evolved and older workers' exposure to labor market volatility has increased.
The loss of income -and, potentially, health insurance coverage -makes retiring earlier than one had planned costly: after a decade-long decline in early claiming, the proportion of 62 year olds claiming Social Security retirement benefits spiked in 2009 (Bosworth and Burtless 2010; Johnson and Mommaerts 2010) , decreasing early claimants' benefits by nearly 5 percent each month for the remainder of their lives (Rutledge and Coe 2012 ).
An extensive literature documents that higher unemployment rates are associated with earlier retirement (Coile and Levine 2007 , 2011a , 2011b von Wachter 2007; Munnell et al. 2008; Friedberg, Owyang, and Webb 2008) . Other research focusing on individual job loss finds that separation increases the likelihood that individuals exit the labor force Stevens 1999, 2004; Stevens and Chan 2001; Tatsiramos 2010) .
Less is known, however, about how an individual's job search influences the timing of the retirement decision, due to a combination of data limitations and the contextdependent definition of "retirement. " Only Hallberg (2011) investigates the timing of the retirement decision in a hazard model framework, but his work focuses on Sweden, which differs from the United States in the structure of its UI and retirement benefit systems.
This project provides the first estimates of the association between the timing of retirement and unemployment duration in the United States, emphasizing how this relationship is influenced by the availability of social insurance benefits, financial assets, pension coverage, and macroeconomic conditions. Further, this paper analyzes how the retirement responses to unemployment duration and access to alternative income sources has changed over more than two decades, a particularly relevant topic given the continuing labor market weakness following the Great Recession.
The results indicate that retirement occurs early during one's jobless spell.
Surprisingly, the timing of retirement has only a slight correlation with labor market conditions and the availability of UI benefits. Rather than using resources like financial wealth, Social Security benefits, and defined benefit pensions to make ends meet during a long job search, the availability of these resources is associated with a higher probability of retiring in any given period. Jobless individuals in poor health or with work-limiting disabilities also retire sooner, and those with working spouses have similar jobless spell durations to those whose spouses have already stopped working. Given that about half of retirements end immediately after job separation, and the majority of the remainder retire within a year, the older unemployed appear to have little desire, or ability, to maintain long job searches.
Data and Methodology
The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) interviews each individual in a panel of households every four months for a two-to four-year period. The survey covers labor force status, earnings, job characteristics, job search activity among the unemployed, public program participation and benefit levels, health insurance coverage, and household and family structure. These core variables, collected for each month within the four-month wave, are supplemented by routine topical modules regarding assets and liabilities, pension coverage, and health status, among many other topics. New panels began each year from 1990-1993, plus 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008. 1 Although the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is more commonly used for analyses of retirement, SIPP provides several advantages. Most important, though SIPP follows households for a shorter period, data are available for each month with a far shorter recall window (four months instead of two years), with more detailed information on job search activity. SIPP began earlier than HRS, which started in 1992, and has released data through late 2012, so the analysis of trends in retirement behavior includes a longer period.
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The sample for this study consists of individuals from the 1990-2008 SIPP panels who are observed leaving a job between the ages of 55 and 70.
3 A job separation occurs in month t if individual i works all weeks in month t-1, fewer than four weeks in month t, and no weeks in month t+1; thus, i must have had a job for at least a full month, and the jobless spell must last for at least one month.
In each month following job separation, i experiences exactly one of four potential outcomes: (1) continuing a job search, (2) finding a new job, (3) censoring, or (4) the outcome of interest, either retiring or permanently exiting the labor force. Job search -i.e., continuing the jobless spell -is the base outcome. Re-employment is the reverse of job separation: i finds a new job in month s if he works zero weeks in month s-1, at least one week in month s, and all weeks in month s+1; re-employment thus requires at least one full month of work at the new job. Censoring occurs when the individual is not interviewed by the SIPP, either because of individual attrition or the scheduled conclusion of the SIPP panel.
Unlike the HRS, SIPP has no single established method of determining whether a respondent is retired. This study uses a combination of variables to derive multiple definitions of retirement, based on a sliding scale of stringency.
The most relevant retirement variable is based on i's answer to the question, "What is the main reason [the respondent] did not work at a job or business during the reference period?" The strictest definition of retirement requires the individual to answer "retired" for that wave, while ceasing work and job search for the remainder of i's time in the SIPP. 4 The "quasi-strict" definition of retirement also requires "retired" as an answer, but only requires i to not work or search for a job for at least a four-month period, thereby allowing the individual to "un-retire." 5 The loose definition of retirement also requires i to not work or search for at least four months, but allows other possible answers in addition to "retired": "unable to work because of chronic health condition or disability,"
"taking care of children/other persons," or "not interested in working at a job."
The respondent is asked the number of weeks he searched for a job in each month of the wave; to qualify as not searching, the number weeks in the month spent looking for a job must be equal to zero. 5 The four-month moratorium on work or job search need not coincide with a full wave; for example, i might search for at least a week during each of the first two months of wave w, answer "retired" in the interview month of wave w, and then avoid work or search for at least the first two months of the next wave, w+1. 6 The other possible reasons, all of which disqualify someone from being marked as retired in that wave, are being temporarily unable to work because of illness or injury, pregnancy or childbirth, going to school, unable to find work, on layoff (temporary or indefinite), or other.
A similar variable that is of limited use to this study asks the respondent why he left his previous employer. Among those who eventually retire under the definitions in the paragraph above, about half report that they left their job to retire, or answer that they are not working because they are retired in the question discussed in the previous paragraph. Because this study is primarily interested in those who retire only after some period of job search, the regression sample includes only those who do not report retiring at the time they leave their job, and do not consider themselves retired at the first interview month after separation.
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An important limitation of this method of defining retirement is that SIPP began asking the question about why the respondent is not working starting only in the 1996
panel. In order to compare labor market activity trends among older individuals over a longer period of time , this study also analyzes the decision to permanently exit the labor force. Labor force exit simply requires the end of job search activity, regardless of the label put on the individual's current status; that is, whether he's retired or discouraged, all that matters is that's no longer actively seeking a job. Because some individuals, however, might drift in and out of labor force participation (Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin 2013) , the definition of "permanent" must ensure that one is not considered to have exited the labor force for good just because the panel happened to end during one of these drifts. 8 The respondent is considered to have left the labor force permanently if he has no weeks working or searching for at least the final six months that he is in the SIPP panel. As with retirement, the relevant population "at risk" consists of those who do not leave the labor force right away, but do so only after a period of unsuccessful job search.
7 This sample exclusion matches the relevant retirement definition: when the potential outcome is retirement under the strict or quasi-strict definition, only those who report leaving their job for "retirement or old age" are excluded. When the potential outcome is, instead, the loose definition of retirement, those who leave their previous job for "retirement or old age," "other family/personal obligations," "own illness," or "own injury" are excluded. In each regression with retirement as a potential outcome, the sample further excludes those who are within four months of censoring, because by definition no one is at risk of retiring by the quasi-strict or loose definitions. Though not required by the strict retirement definition, this restriction eliminates the possibility that the strict retirement definition captures people who are not observed long enough to show up as retired by the other two definitions; otherwise, someone who reports being "retired" with only two more monthly observations before censoring would be marked as "strictly" retired, but not "quasi-strictly," even though he could get a job soon after SIPP stops interviewing him. 8 Note that permanent labor force exit requires zero weeks of working and searching, while re-employment requires at least one full month of work. This definition will mark individuals with spotty employment experiences -some weeks worked, but never all four or five weeks in a month -during the remainder of the panel as neither fully re-employed, nor fully out of the labor force.
The sample, therefore, is limited to individuals who stay in the labor force at least one month after separation and keeps only those person-months at least six months from the end of the individual's sample window, after which any ongoing spells are considered censored. A complementary reason to collapse person-months into person-waves is that the variable that identifies retirement varies only by wave, rather than by month. Labor force exit, on the other hand, varies by month, but seam bias concerns prevail: in a multinomial logit of person-months (instead of person-waves), the estimated marginal effect for every fourth month dummy is much larger than the dummies for surrounding months, even after including a dummy for interview month, à la Ham, Li, and Shore-Sheppard (2009). 12 Summary statistics for all independent variables are reported in Table A1 . 13 This calculation is for all workers, not just those who eventually experience a job loss and thus enter the sample.
remaining UI eligibility: (1) the individual is eligible for UI and does not exhaust his benefits during the interview wave, (2) the individual exhausts benefits at some point during the wave, or (3) the individual is no longer eligible for UI at any point during the wave (the omitted condition). This information is collected from U.S. Department of Labor reports on state UI parameters.
14 Most higher-net-worth individuals who leave their jobs would not be in the sample, as they are more likely to report leaving their job for retirement or to never spend time searching after a separation, whether or not the job separation was planned well in Retirement is also easier to manage for those who have employer pensions. SIPP collects information on defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) pension plans from the current job and any previous jobs as part of a once-per-panel topical module.
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The model includes two (not mutually exclusive) indicator variables for whether the individual reports any DB or DC pension coverage. As with Social Security benefits, DB pension receipt does not correspond perfectly with retirement; 28 percent of workers age 62 to 70 report income from a DB plan.
Another important factor is the age and work status of one's spouse. Married couples tend to retire together; Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) The model uses SIPP-provided weights that capture the complex survey design.
All tables report the marginal effects -i.e., the derivative of the outcome variable with respect to the particular variable, averaged over all individuals in the sample -that take into account the non-linearity of the multinomial logit model, including interactions (Ai and Norton 2003) . Standard errors for the marginal effects are calculated by the Delta method.
Results
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The information on work-limiting or work-preventing health conditions is collected for each wave in the core. The individual's self-reported health status on a five-point scale is asked multiple times each panel, as part of topical modules on disabilities and health care spending; this information is merged with the nearest interview wave.
Unconditional Results. shorter, but the duration before finding re-employment hovers around seven months regardless of their age. Spells ending in retirement at the same time that UI is exhausted conclude almost one month earlier on average than spells ending in re-employment around UI exhaustion, a statistically significant difference. The widest gap between retirement and re-employment in the duration of spells is in the middle quintile, where spells ending in retirement last almost 1.5 months longer than spells ending in a job.
Unmarried individuals wait longer to retire than those with the support of a working spouse or with a spouse who is no longer working; the latter finding is consistent with the joint retirement decision.
Retirees in states with high unemployment rates spend more time searching: the average duration is more than a month longer than those who retire in low unemployment 17 Censored spells (not shown), not surprisingly, last longer on average.
states, and 0.7 months longer than residents of similar states who find re-employment.
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The time before retirement is 0.8 months longer without a DB plan than with one, but those with a DC pension retire more rapidly than those without; both findings are consistent with the greater mobility allowed by 401(k) plans compared to traditional pensions. Finally, fair or poor health and work limitations are both associated with longer durations before both retiring and finding re-employment; these unhealthy individuals, who are nonetheless still working after 55, are less eager to retire than those without health concerns, but they may also have trouble finding a new employer to accommodate their health needs.
The summary statistics by age suggest that the availability of Social Security retirement benefits plays an important role in the decision to retire after a job loss, even though many continue searching for a job after they become Social Security beneficiaries. Security is a resource that could help individuals support themselves during a job search.
Multinomial Regression Analysis. Table 5 reports the results of three multinomial regressions, where re-employment is one outcome and one of the three definitions of retirement (strict, quasi-strict, and loose) is the other. The top line reports that, in any given wave, between 15 and 20 percent of jobless spells ended in re-employment; this varies by the definition of retirement, as spells can end for one kind of retirement but not another. The probability in a given wave of strict retirement is 8 percent; quasi-strict retirement is 11 percent; and loose retirement is 19 percent, almost matching reemployment.
A higher state unemployment rate is associated with a lower probability of quasistrict or loose retirement, along with a lower probability of re-employment by any definition. Although the relationship between retirement and local labor market conditions is statistically significant, the estimated magnitude is quite small: a one- Despite indications to the contrary in Tables 2 and 3 , retirement is not significantly associated with UI eligibility. Re-employment is more common in the months that UI is available than in the months after UI has been exhausted, but the estimated magnitudes for retirement are relatively small and inconsistently signed.
The picture for wealth is much clearer: as net worth increases, retirement becomes more common in any given wave. Individuals in the highest wealth quintile are 3.7
percentage points more likely to retire (loose definition) in a wave than those in the middle quintile. Having a DB pension plan also increases the retirement hazard:
retirement is 4 to 7 percentage points (or 37 to 49 percent of the mean hazard) more likely if the individual has DB coverage from any previous job. DC plans are associated with a statistically significant but small reduction in the strict retirement hazard; there is no relationship between DC coverage and the other definitions of retirement, while DC coverage is associated with an increase in the re-employment hazard.
The marginal effects for the marital status variables for strict and quasi-strict retirement accord with previous research that suggests the importance of the joint retirement decision. Married individuals whose spouse does not work are 1.5 to 5.6
percentage points (18 to 30 percent above the mean) more likely to retire in a given wave than are the unmarried. But the marginal effect of a working spouse more than offsets the married marginal effect for strict and quasi-strict retirement, so that the combined effect on the retirement decision is not statistically significantly different from single people. With loose retirement, on the other hand, the working spouse effect is negligible, so married individuals retire at the same rate regardless of whether their spouses are working or not. In all specifications, spouse's age does not appear to play a role in one's own retirement decision.
Most other variables in the regression are insignificant; there is little difference by education, race, or Hispanic origin. 19 Other results, including those not reported here, are inconsistent -low-income individuals are less likely to retire by the strict and quasi-strict definitions but not by the loose definition, and those who obtained health insurance through their former job are less likely to retire in any given wave only by the loose definition. The third-to-last row in Table 5 reports that women are more likely to retire by the loose definition, but less likely to retire by the quasi-strict definition; neither estimate is qualitatively large, but these opposing results are consistent with women retiring to take care of an ailing spouse, elderly parent, or grandchild. Finally, those with work limitations are less likely to retire by the strict or quasi-strict definition, but are more likely to retire by the loose definition; given that the loose definition includes those who retire for chronic illness or injury, this result is to be expected. Fair or poor health, on the other hand, has a consistently positive correlation with retirement. retirement regressions in Table 4 . The results are largely similar between the two periods, however; the mean hazard rate is 8 percent in both periods, and most variables have similar magnitudes and qualitative findings.
As with retirement, labor force exit has a small negative though statistically significant correlation (only for the full sample) with the state unemployment rate. With respect to the age categories, the general picture is the same as the retirement regressions:
Social Security benefits allow for a quicker exit from the labor force. As with retirement, labor force exit is not significantly correlated with UI eligibility, and the probability of leaving the labor force increases with wealth and among those with DB pensions.
Similarly, labor force exit is more common for married individuals with non-working spouses, but it is no more or less common for married individuals with working spouses, compared to single individuals.
The correlations between retirement and gender, and retirement and health, differ by whether the definition includes health-related reasons for not working. The three estimates at the bottom of Table 6 by any definition, and the decline is generally monotonic for more than a year thereafter.
Not surprisingly, the loose definition of retirement is most common, but the likelihood of retiring (loosely defined) falls rapidly between 6-7 months and 12-13 months after separation. This sharp decline occurs four months earlier for strict and quasi-strict retirement and is more gradual for labor force exit. Other than loose retirement, the other four series continue to decline until about 16-17 months; after that, there is a slight rebound, and loose retirement is about as common just over two years after separation as it is just under a year after separation. These results emphasize that retirement and labor force exit are most likely early in the jobless spell; if an older individual has not retired within the first 8-12 months, he is likely to remain on the fringe of the labor force for another year or more.
While the unconditional correlations in Table 3 indicate that retirement and local labor market conditions might be related, the regression results thus far indicate that a higher unemployment rate is associated with a very slight delay in retirement. 20 To test the robustness of this finding, additional specifications are estimated that include interactions between the unemployment rate and categories for age, remaining UI eligibility, and months since separation. Table 7 presents the level and interaction effects and standard errors for age and UI eligibility; the level effects for non-interacted variables are largely unchanged.
Only a few of the interaction effects are statistically significantly different from zero; accordingly, the level effects for age are nearly identical to the results from Tables 5   and 6 . The previously noisier estimates for UI eligibility, however, exhibit more change:
now the early months of UI eligibility are associated with almost half as many retirements (defined loosely) than in the months after UI becomes unavailable, but this result is just barely statistically significant. The positive sign on most of the age interactions suggest that retirement and labor force exit are slightly more rapid in waves with higher unemployment rates among people who have just reached their 62 nd birthdays, but only two of the 15 interaction effects reported in Table 7 are statistically significant.
To get a sense of the magnitude of these interactions, Figures 2a, 2b , and 2c plot the predicted probability of retiring (under the loose definition) in each month after job separation for individuals at ages 55-61, 62, and 65. These simulations compare the predicted retirement hazard for these age groups at two different unemployment rates: 5 20 The marginal effect of state unemployment rates in multinomial regression models where it enters as a quadratic are smaller and less statistically significant than the results reported in Tables 4 and 5. percent, which is the average unemployment rate between January 2004 and December 2007 (the expansion); and 8.3 percent, which is the average unemployment rate from January 2008 to December 2012 (during the Great Recession and early recovery).
For the hypothetical individual who is not yet eligible for Social Security, retirement is actually more likely in the first nine months when the unemployment rate is lower compared to the weaker economy, by between 4 and 7 percentage points ( Figure   2a ). From 10 to 19 months, though, retirement becomes more common at the higher unemployment rate than at the lower unemployment rate, and thereafter is approximately the same. The pattern is nearly identical, though the predicted hazard is higher in each month for those who are just reaching their 62 nd birthdays (Figure 2b ). The pattern is similar for those reaching their FRA (Figure 2c ), though the gap is larger: the predicted probability of retiring is more than 12 percentage points higher in months 8-9 when the unemployment rate is low, but switches to being over 6 percentage points higher 14-15 months after job loss when the unemployment rate is high. None of the interaction effects between the unemployment rate and months since job separation are statistically significant. The patterns in these results suggest that retirement is slightly more likely in the early months of a jobless spell when the unemployment rate is low, and later on becomes slightly more likely when the unemployment rate is high, especially for older individuals with access to Social Security retirement benefits.
Results by Age. Table 8 tests the robustness of the loose retirement and labor force exit estimates across three age categories: before age 62, from age 62 up to the FRA, and at and after the FRA. Among 55-61 year olds (first two columns), labor force exit is statistically significantly less likely when the unemployment rate is high, but as with the full sample, the magnitude of the effect is small (about 11 percent of the mean hazard rate). Both retirement and exit are significantly less likely when UI is still available, but the wave of UI exhaustion is not statistically different from waves without UI. As relative net worth increases, both retirement and exit become more likely, and those with DB pensions are more likely to retire or exit the labor force. Married individuals, women, and those with work limitations or fair or poor health are also more likely to retire or exit in any given wave after job separation.
The correlations are substantially weaker once Social Security benefits become available (last four columns). DB pensions and work limitations are still associated with more rapid retirement or labor force exit among after the 62 nd birthday, though not for those at or above their FRA. The positive correlation between net worth and retirement or exit also becomes weaker around age 62, but it is actually stronger for retirement at FRA. The results in the full sample, then, seem to be driven almost entirely by the unemployed before age 62. Results for the Non-Disabled. The main results indicate that having a health condition that limits one's ability to work has one of the strongest and most consistent estimated correlations with retirement and labor force exit, especially among the unemployed younger than 62. 21 This result suggests that many work-limited individuals may fall back on Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) rather than wait for retirement benefits from Social Security or DB plans. Previous literature has found that SSDI application is strongly correlated with the unemployment rate (see Autor and Duggan, 2006 , for a review) and that unemployed individuals are more likely to apply, especially after UI benefits are exhausted (Rutledge 2012a) . Since a disability applicant must have income below the Substantial Gainful Activity level ($1,040 per month in 2013), many applicants will drop out of the labor force.
Results by
To test whether SSDI applicants drive the above results, 
Conclusions
Older workers, understanding that their retirement years will be, in all likelihood, longer and less secure than the previous generation, report time and again that they plan to work longer (Munnell and Rutledge 2013 ). Yet the proportion of older workers finding themselves jobless has increased over time, and the lure of retirement, instead of a difficult job search, may be hard to resist. Yet many are making the retirement decision amid a diminished ability to support one's pre-retirement lifestyle. This project explores the interaction between these two competing forces, examining how long jobless individuals age 55 and over are willing to search for a new job before they reach their "point of no return."
The results suggest that for job separations that do not result in an immediate retirement, half of the jobless spells end in retirement and half in re-employment. Among individuals whose jobless spells end in retirement, most of them do so within a year after separation. The availability of resources like Social Security retirement benefits, high net worth, and defined benefit pensions appear to encourage more rapid labor force exit and retirement, rather than supporting job seekers during a long search. Surprisingly, when the unemployment rate is high and new jobs are hard to find, retirement is only modestly more likely, with most of the effect concentrated in those who are eligible to claim Social Security benefits. But a longer duration in another public program -unemployment insurance benefits -has little effect on retirement timing. Finally, poor health and worklimiting disabilities are associated with more rapid labor force exit and retirement.
These results should be interpreted with some caution, because the sample of individuals who find themselves out of work late in their careers and choose not to immediately retire is non-random and possibly self-selected. While some of the key variables are exogenous to the individual's retirement or re-employment decision-making -age and the Social Security retirement benefit eligibility, state unemployment rate, and UI benefit duration -others, like net worth and the presence of a working spouse, are endogenous. The results may not be generalizable to all older workers and should not be interpreted as causal.
The brevity of jobless spells suggests that older individuals have little tolerance for job search, and those who can afford to make a quick exit -falling back on a substantial financial portfolio and annuities from Social Security and previous employers -will do so. The lack of evidence of an association between labor market conditions and the retirement decision indicates that one's impatience has little to do with the difficulty of the job search. Still, changes in recent decades that have eroded retirement security indicate that coming cohorts of older jobless people will not be able to afford the same haste to retire: defined benefit pensions and retiree health insurance coverage are all but extinct in the private sector, Social Security benefits replace a smaller proportion of each successive generation's income, and 401(k) balances do not make up for the shortfall.
On the upside, workers in their 50s and 60s are healthier and better able to continue working, and have more general experience and less firm-specific capital than previous generations. All of these may better position them to take advantage of social networks to find jobs than younger competition. The uptick in the average duration of jobless spells portends longer job searches for older unemployed Americans, but their patience and persistence may pay off in rewarding second acts. 
